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THE DEMISE OF THE RABBICULAR TRUST
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service"), through
Thomas Brisendine,' Branch 1 Chief of the Office of Associate Counsel for
Employee Benefits/Exempt Organizations, announced that it would take an
adverse position2 on deferred compensation arrangements commonly known
as Rabbicular Trusts. The announcement is a blow to the purveyors of these
plans, given the high-stakes nature of the Service's position, and litigation is
almost certain to follow.' This Recent Development examines the
implications for non-qualified deferred compensation planning if the Service
fails to halt the use of Rabbicular Trusts. The Recent Development also
analyzes the principles upon which this issue will ultimately be decided in
litigation.
II. IF THE RABBICULAR TRUST SURVIVES-IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEE
In order to appreciate the significance of the Rabbicular Trust debate, it is
first necessary to understand the current options available for deferred
1. Meegan M. Reilly, Updated Guidance on Nonqualified Plans, Split-Dollar Arrangements
Unlikely, Brisendine Says, 68 TAX NOTES 1457 (1995). The Associate Counsel's office, of which
Thomas Brisendine is the Chief Counsel, is responsible for providing taxpayer guidance on specific
questions relating to contemplated actions. This guidance may take several forms; however, the most
common is the Private Letter Ruling. A Private Letter Ruling is a binding commitment by the Service
that if the facts are exactly as the taxpayer presents them, the Service will treat the arrangement in the
agreed-upon fashion for tax purposes. Private Letter Rulings are both fact-intensive and expensive, and
provide no precedential support to similarly situated taxpayers absent their obtaining a similar ruling.
I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1994).
2. An adverse position indicates that the Service will refuse to issue favorable rulings on these
plans and will demand current inclusion of income attempted to be deferred through the use of such an
arrangement. An adverse position is not an immutable stance, because it may be challenged either
directly or through a refund suit. However, a statement of an adverse position is a strong indication of
the Service's interpretation of the law. See DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 11 (3d ed. 1994).
3. The Rabbicular Trust is a creation of St. Louis attorney Michael Goldstein of the firm Husch
& Eppenberger. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1457. The term Rabbicular Trust is a Registered Service Mark
of Husch & Eppenberger. Id. The use of a Service Mark to denote an employee deferred compensation
vehicle is more than a little unusual and has drawn bemused comment both from representatives of the
Service and from other practitioners. See Lee A. Sheppard, Substance and Form and 'Rabbicular'
Trusts, 70 TAX NOTES 349 (1996). Mr. Brisendine himself uses a mocking hand-signaled quotation
mark when using the term in his own talks to the practitioner community.
4. For a discussion of the potential benefits of a positive ruling on the Rabbicular Trust, see
infra Part II.D.
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compensation,5 and how these choices would be affected by the use of a
Rabbicular Trust. The currently available options considered will be limited
to the two most common nonqualified deferral arrangements:6 the secular
trust7 and the rabbi trust.' The Rabbicular Trust will then be contrasted to
these currently approved arrangements in both its technical differences and
the practical implications of its use.9
A. The Secular Trust
The secular trust is a device whereby an employer pays compensation
directly into trust for payment to its employee at some future date.' At all
times after payment into trust, the trust funds are reserved for the exclusive
benefit of the employee," the employee has a vested right to the future
5. As discussed in this Recent Development, deferred compensation refers exclusively to plans
which are not "qualified" under I.R.C. § 401(a). Nonqualified plans are nonetheless governed by the
provisions of ERISA. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. N. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829, § 3(3) (1976) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994)). However, they are not
generally subject to some of the more onerous administrative regulations, such as many of the
reporting provisions, due to their status as "Top Hat" plans. A "Top Hat" plan is one that benefits only
a select group of highly compensated employees ("HCEs"). The definition of what exactly constitutes
an HCE is rather vague; however, it is clear the employees considering the use of rabbi and Rabbicular
Trusts, ostensibly because they have exceeded the $30,000 limit on qualified plan contributions, I.R.C.
§ 401-409 (1994), fall within this HCE classification. "ERISA exempts ... unfunded arrangement[s]
'primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or
highly compensated employees."' James C. Dinan, Nonqualifled Deferred Compensation Plans Get A
Boost, 22 TAx'N FOR LAW. 324, 331 (1994) (citing ERISA §§ 201(2), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), I 101(a)(1) (1994)).
6. The distinction between qualified and nonqualified deferral arrangements is beyond the scope
of this Recent Development. For a full discussion of the distinction between the two types of deferral
arrangements, see C. Wells Hall III, Nonqualified Deferred Compensation: Rabbi and Secular Trusts,
CA17 ALI-ABA 779 (1995).
7. The specifies of the secular trust are outlined in greater detail infra Part ll.A.
8. The specifics of the rabbi trust are outlined infra Part ll.B. The rabbi trust began with Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 31, 1980). The name "rabbi trust" stems from the fact that the taxpayer who
requested the ruling was a rabbi. See id.; Service to Resume Ruling on Rabbi Trusts, 65 J. TAX'N 108,
108 (1986). In the often colorful world of the tax attorney, the alternative arrangement, under which
benefits are secured for the employee, has been dubbed a "secular trust."
9. See infra Part II.C. The main distinction between a Rabbicular Trust and a rabbi trust is the
presence of financial performance "vesting triggers." See infra notes 26, 31 and accompanying text.
10. The trust is created and funded by the employer. The exact terms of the trust vary; however,
there is no requirement that the employee attain retirement age for distribution. In fact, many such
arrangements defer benefits only for a period of years. This result follows from the nonqualified nature
of the plans, under the Internal Revenue Code and the exemptions of ERISA. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994);
ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994).
11. These benefits are immediately vested, with no possibility of forfeiture. This result is
contractual, since the employer has funded the arrangement with funds set aside solely for the
1316
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payments of this income, and the assets are protected against the claims of the
firm's unsecured creditors in the event of an insolvency. 2 Because only the
timing of receipt is affected," an interest under a secular trust is considered
"property" transferred in connection with the performance of services for
purposes of § 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), 14 and is therefore
taxable to the employee when earned. 5 Since these contributions are paid for
employee's benefit. See generally Hall, supra note 6. It is in fact this "ownership" of the assets, or
more precisely the absence of a substantial risk of forfeiture, that results in current income tax liability
for the assets when earned. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
12. Early variations of secular trusts included restricted stock plans, insurance, and other
insundary annuity plans. These efforts met with mixed success in litigation against the Service. The
success of restricted stock plans in achieving deferral led to the adoption of I.R.C. § 83 by Congress in
1969. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 399-410 (10th ed.
1994).
13. See supra notes 10- 1l. Timing of receipt relates directly to the doctrine of constructive
receipt which is discussed infra note 15.
14 I.R.C. § 83(a) states that:
(a) If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred... the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property... [when the] property [rights] are transferable or
are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture... over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the gross income of the
person who performed such services ....
I.R.C. § 83(a).
Noticeably absent from this analysis is a discussion of the economic benefit doctrine. This is a
common-law doctrine which developed through a series of court cases. See, e.g., Sproull v.
Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (T.C. 1951), afd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952). The purpose
of the economic benefit doctrine was to stymie the efforts of taxpayers to achieve deferral by cleverly
drafting around the constructive receipt doctrine, discussed infra note 15. See, e.g., United States v.
Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821 (1950) (taxing annuity contract to
employee despite employer's purchase and the non-alienability of the employee's interest); Robinson
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 20 (T.C. 1965) (preventing the application of the constructive receipt
doctrine through a taxpayer-engineered, arms-length transaction).
While there is nothing to suggest that this policy concern is not still present, there is support for
the contention that I.RC. § 83, adopted in 1969, may have codified the elements of the economic
benefit doctrine and effectively replaced it. This view has been widely championed in academic
publications. See, e.g., Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good
Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419 (1984).
For an excellent discussion of the Service's position on the economic benefit doctrine and the
application of I.R.C. § 83(a) to rabbi trusts, see Dinan, supra note 5, at 326-28. Dinan also discusses
constructive receipt. See infra note 15.
15. I.RC. §§ 61(a), 63(a), 451 (1994). I.R.C. § 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from
whatever source derived...." I.R.C. § 63(a) defines taxable income as "gross income minus the
deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard deduction)." I.R.C. § 451 provides that the
proper year of inclusion is "the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer.. .." Treasury
Regulation § 1.45-1(a) (1996) includes income "actually or constructively received." Additionally,
regulation § 1.446-1(c)(1)(1) (1996) relating to the cash method of accounting also states that
"[g]enerally ... all items which constitute gross income... are to be included for the taxable year in
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the employee's sole benefit, they are also deductible by the employer when
paid into the trust. 6 The earnings of the monies placed in the secular trust are
taxed at the corporate rate while so held.' 7 With the exception of the first few
years following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act"),"8 corporate tax
rates have been lower than the top marginal individual rates, 9 making the tax
savings on the trust earnings the engine driving the use of secular trusts.2"
B. The Rabbi Trust
The rabbi trust is similar in operation to the secular trust. However, unlike
the secular trust, rabbi trust assets held by the company are not protected
against the claims of the company's general unsecured creditors.2 Thus, if the
company were to become insolvent, it is possible that the deferred
compensation placed in the rabbi trust would never be paid to the employee'
which actually or constructively received." See also Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, examples 1-3
(giving examples of actual and constructive receipt).
16. I.R.C. §§ 162(a)(1), 404(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a) (1996).
17. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1992); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.404(a)-i to 1.404(k)-iT (1996). This follows from
the more general "matching" principle. I.R.C. § 404(a) (1994). See also Drescher, 179 F.2d at 541 (6th
Cir. 1952) (articulating matching of income with regard to an annuity). The matching principle is a
device designed to ensure that income does not escape taxation. See generally supra note 11. Thus, if
income is not currently taxable to the employee, it is not deductible by the employer except for
qualified plans. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994) (establishing requirements for qualified plans). In the case of
the rabbi trust, see infra Part ll.B, the employer is not permitted a deduction because the employee is
allowed deferral until and to the extent that the employee includes the compensation in taxable income.
18. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The 1986 Act dramatically flattened the progressive marginal
individual income tax rates and replaced them with a two-tiered rate structure. See infra note 20.
19. See infra note 20.
20. Of course, to the extent the employer's tax rate is below that of the employee's, there is a net
tax benefit on the trust income. Were the income taxed to the employee, the higher personal rate would
apply. However, if the income is taxed to the employer, the employee pays less taxes to the extent that
the employee avoids the difference between the higher personal income tax rates and the lower
corporate rates. After the 1986 revision of the tax rates, individual top rates fell below the corporate tax
rate for the first time in recent memory-since at least the Korean War. while subsequent changes in
the tax code have pushed the top rates above the corporate rate again, these increases are not nearly the
incentive that 50% and 70% top rates were for the use of secular trusts. See Hall, supra note 6, at 783-
84. Currently, the top rate for up to $250,000 in annual income is 36%, I.R.C. § 1 (1994), only 2%
above the large corporate rate of 34%. I.R.C. § 11 (1994). For individual incomes over $250,000, the
top rate increases to 39.6%, I.R.C. § 1 (1994), a differential of 5.6% over the corporate rate. This is
precious little compensation for the rigidity inherent in a secular trust arrangement.
21. E.g., KAHN, supra note 2, at 149. For a discussion of the characteristics of the secular trust,
see supra Part II.A.
22. KAHN, supra note 2, at 149. The possibility of loss is not a certainty even in the event of
corporate insolvency. The requirements of Rev. Rul. 60-31, supra note 15, examples 1-4, and Rev.
Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100 (modifying Rev. Rul. 60-31, example 5), requiring a substantial risk of
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but would instead be used to satisfy the claims of the company's general
unsecured creditors.23 This difference is significant in two ways. First, the risk
of loss removes rabbi trust interests from the ambit of I.R.C. § 83(a)
"property," resulting in the exclusion of the deferred compensation from the
employee's income until actual receipt.24 Second, the resulting risk also
renders these plans less attractive to the very types of companies that
regularly utilize nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements.2
There have thus been a number of efforts to capture both the tax deferral
benefits associated with the rabbi trust and the security of the secular trust in
one instrument. The Rabbicular Trust is one example of this effort.
C. The Rabbicular Trust
The Rabbicular Trust seizes upon a feature of the rabbi trust known as a
"triggering event" or a "vesting trigger" '26 in an attempt to adhere to the
required form of the rabbi trust while increasing the security of the assets so
held. Rabbi trust interests, which are not protected from the employer's
creditors, vest in the employee and are placed out of the reach of the
employer's creditors upon the occurrence of a triggering event.28 Triggering
forfeiture, do not require that the employee must risk loss of everything.
23. KAHN, supra note 2, at 149. However, the employees do have some recourse in case of
employer insolvency. Under Chapter I 1 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994), the
employees would have claims as general unsecured creditors of the firm, and would in fact have some
priority among 'such creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1994). However, since the employees still
remain in the pool of unsecured creditors, it is almost certain that the employees would be paid less
than full value, probably receiving only pennies on the dollar.
24. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107, supra note 8 (permitting the first rabbi trust).
25. Companies that regularly utilize nonqualified compensation arrangements often include
smaller, more entrepreneurial companies, in which there are typically greater degrees of risk than other
types of companies. But see Alexander Cockburn, Glass-Steagall and the Fall of the House of Barings,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995 (trading activities of a lone trader financially destroyed one of the
oldest, and most prestigious, major securities firms), available in 1995 WL 5002748.
26. In a discussion of a Rabbicular Trust, the term "vesting trigger" does not refer to vesting as
prescribed by LR.C. §§ 401(a), 411 (1994) or ERISA § 3(25), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(25) (1994). Instead,
"vesting trigger" is a defined term referring to events that trigger the transformation of the interest
from unsecured to secured for purposes of I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994). Examples of permitted triggers are
discussed infra at notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
27. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107, supra note 8 (upholding the viability of the instrument). This
Recent Development assumes that rabbi trusts, as discussed, meet the Service's requirements as set
forth in Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422. One model provision given by the Service requires that
"[a]ny assets held by the [rabbi] Trust will be subject to the claims of the Company's general creditors
under federal and state law in the event of Insolvency, as defined in Section 3(a) herein." Id. at 424
(emphasis added).
28. The conversion from a rabbi trust to a secular trust involves the elimination of the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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events contemplated by the Service include death, disability, and the
employee's voluntary or involuntary separation from service.29 In addition,
the Service has approved triggering events that rely on the mere passage of
time or the employee's attainment of a certain age.3" The Rabbicular Trust
would extend the breadth of these triggering events to include declining
financial prospects for the employing company.3
A Rabbicular Trust uses the required model fonmat for a rabbi trust 2 but,
in the optional trigger section,33 it adds vesting triggers based upon the
occurrence of a financial event involving the company. Examples of the
"substantial risk of forfeiture" provision. The elimination causes the secular trust to fall within I.RC.
§ 83(a) and thus funds within it are treated as income. The secular trust funds are held by the employer
solely for the employee's benefit. See supra notes 10-11. The general unsecured creditors of the firm
have no ability to claim these funds in the event of the employer's insolvency. Thus, with regard to
these funds there is no substantial risk of forfeiture.
29. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-005 (May 8, 1992); infra note 30. An interesting side issue
involving the Rabbicular Trust looks to the vesting triggers as a factor in a bankruptcy case. The court
would determine if the "vesting" of the trust constitutes a preference in favor ofthe employee, and if it
is thus subject to being set aside by a bankruptcy court. The court would almost certainly set aside the
trust. Such an action would make the drafting of Rabbicular Trust triggers an even more skillful
exercise, because to protect the employee's interest the trigger must not only vest the benefits prior to
bankruptcy, but must do so at least one year prior to the bankruptcy filing. See I 1 U.S.C. 507(a)(3)(8)
(1994). Designing such a trigger that would not be so sensitive to short-term financial crises as to vest
employees' interests prematurely is another topic altogether, if Rabbicular Trusts are in fact a viable
arrangement.
30. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-05-033 (Nov. 6, 1991) (occurrence of a specific event); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-
27-020 (Apr. 1, 1992) (passage of time triggers). Additionally, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-03-018 (Oct. 18,
1991) includes several distinct triggers, while Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-03-008 (Oct. 19, 1993) includes none.
The Service has not commented on the number of permitted triggers, probably because the triggers so
far permitted do not affect the fundamental tax features of the trust.
31. A financial performance trigger behaves no differently from the garden variety triggers of
death, disability, or change of control. For a discussion of the garden variety triggers, see supra notes
26-30 and accompanying text. However, financial performance triggers depend upon events relating to
the company as opposed to those relating to the employee, which are the basis for the garden variety
triggers. An important area of overlap between the permissible triggers and the financial performance
trigger is the change of control provision. This change of control trigger focuses on an event unrelated
to the employee's control and is expressly permitted. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422, 424, § 1(e)
(laying out the model trust).
The clear difference between previously allowed triggers and financial performance triggers is
their purpose. The permissible triggers, including the change of control trigger, were designed to
protect the interests of the employee from frustration by those with whom she did not bargain. In
contrast, a financial performance trigger works to secure benefits prior to the issuing company's
descent into bankruptcy. From a policy perspective, this purpose is not beneficial, because financial
performance triggers seek to indemnify the employee from the very risks that allowed income deferral
in the first instance. See supra note 29 (concerning the practical limits imposed by the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994)).
32. Rev. Proc. 92-64, supra note 27 (giving a model format for rabbi trusts).
33. Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 424.
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additional financial triggers include a drop in the company's stock price or a
negative change in a company's financial ratios.34 The Rabbicular Trust could
utilize one or more of these devices." However, the goal would remain the
same: to protect the deferred compensation from loss due to company
insolvency. 6 The question is whether this protection drags the deferred
compensation back under the I.R.C. § 83 definition of property-similar to a
secular trust37-or whether model provisions given by the Servic s permit
these anangements to qualify for deferral of compensation like rabbi trust
interests. Although the Service has indicated that the first position is
appropriate, 39 not all indicators support that conclusion.4"
D. The Impact on Deferred Compensation of an Approved Rabbicular
Trust
Before the 1986 Act, when the top marginal individual tax rates were
significantly higher than corporate rates,4" the secular trust afforded an
attractive deferred compensation device for highly compensated employees
("HCEs").42 Currently, however, the minute gap between top individual tax
rates and corporate rates' tends to reduce the attractiveness of a secular
34. Negative changes in a company's financial ratio could occur, for example, in either the price
to earnings ratio or the debt coverage ratio. However, a discussion of the appropriate use of financial
performance ratios to properly insulate the trust assets from corporate insolvency is beyond the scope
of this Recent Development. For an excellent discussion of the appropriate use of financial ratios in
evaluating corporate performance, see DIANA R. HARRINGTON & BRENT D. WILSON, CORPORATE
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (1983).
35. The particular measure of a company's financial health is well beyond the scope of this
Recent Development. The measures used to illustrate are simply well known financial yardsticks, and
are by no means either the best or the most effective triggering standards.
36. Once the concept of the financial trigger is approved, there will be little principled basis for
distinguishing between either the type of trigger or the number of triggers. See supra note 30
(discussing the use of varying amounts of currently allowed triggers in approved rabbi trusts).
37. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
38. Rev. Proc. 92-64, supra note 27.
39. See IRS Official Discusses Nonqualified Plan Issues, PENSION & BENEFITS WEEK, Dec. 13,
1993, at 2, 3.
40. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014 (Nov. 22, 1994) (permitting a net worth trigger); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-44-038 (Aug. 2, 1993) (permitting an insurance policy on a rabbi trust without affecting ability
to defer tax liability).
41. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
42. Highly compensated employees are eligible for so-called "Top-Hat" benefit plans under
ERISA. See supra note 5.
43. See supra note 20. The current difference between top individual rates and corporate rates is
a mere 5.6% for individuals in the top bracket (39.6% versus 34%). I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1994). For all
other individuals-those earning less than $250,000 per year in adjusted gross income-the corporate
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trust." The decline in secular trust popularity has resulted in the vastly
increased use of rabbi trusts for HCEs.4" However, the risk requirements of
the rabbi trust46 have made benefits available unevenly,47 and have lessened
the value of deferral under these arrangements to the HCEs involved.4" An
approved Rabbicular Trust would dramatically reshape the nonqualified
deferred compensation landscape, potentially rendering ordinary rabbi trusts
obsolete and secular trusts even more unattractive.4"
Skillful use of financial performance vesting triggers in the design of
Rabbicular Trusts should effectively eliminate any real possibility that trust
assets would be lost in the event of company insolvency.5" Thus, the
Rabbicular Trust would boast both the desired deferral of the HCEs income
and a high degree of protection for the deferred compensation. All but the
most risk averse would thus be provided a significant incentive to utilize
tax rates are lower by only 1% or are greater than the individual rates. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (1994) with
I.RC. § 11 (1994).
44. Secular trust monies are taxed at corporate rates, and thus the greater the differential between
corporate and individual tax rates, the more attractive the secular trust becomes. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the current trend in executive deferred compensation planning, see
generally Hall, supra note 6.
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1996) (not including in definition of property "unfunded or
unsecured promise to pay ... in the future"). For a discussion of the definition of property in
evaluating the tax treatment of deferred compensation, see Karen B. Kotner & David G. Shipp,
Unfinded Deferred Compensation: LR.S. Provides Model Rabbi Trust and Consolidates Ruling
Requirements, 20 TAX MGMT.: COMPENSATION PLAN J. 215 (1992).
47. Benefits are available unevenly because the risk of loss is dependent on the employment
setting. Often large corporations with strong balance sheets present little risk of insolvency. The little
risk makes the benefits of the rabbi trust more attractive and valuable to the large corporations'
employees. Most corporate plan sponsors with strong balance sheets and good bond ratings present
little actual risk of forfeiture for their rabbi trust holding employee. But see supra note 25 (noting the
Barings disaster, which demonstrated that even the most secure of firms can become insolvent
quickly).
48. The value of future benefits, like those received under a rabbi trust, is a function of the
discount rate applied. This is a statement, not of tax law, but of basic principles of present value. The
discount rate is further a function of the business risk. See HARRINOTON & WILSON, supra note 34, at
63-65. Since riskier companies will require the application of higher discount rates, their employees
will value deferral at a lower amount than the employees of more stable companies. Id.
49. The secular trust is not likely to go away altogether, because of the bankruptcy risk, see supra
note 29, and the risk aversion of some employees, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
50. While a complete discussion is beyond the scope of this Recent Development, suffice it to
say that short of an instantaneous disaster-such as afflicted Barings, supra note 25-skillfully applies
financial ratio triggers should be able to detect any decline in the underlying financial condition of the
granting employer in plenty of time to allow for vesting of interests. But see supra note 29 (noting the
one-year requirement of vested interests for protection from Bankruptcy laws).
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Rabbicular Trusts in place of secular trusts."1 Rabbi trust beneficiaries would
have even greater incentives to switch instruments,52 because the addition of
financial vesting triggers to existing plans would provide added benefits in
the form of increased asset security. 3 In addition, Rabbicular Trusts would
virtually eliminate the need for, and would certainly lower the cost of, private
insurance for rabbi trust interests.5 4 The Service, perhaps fearing just such a
gold rush, has declared that the protections of the Rabbicular Trust do in fact
go too far to qualify these interests for deferral of tax liability until actual
receipt.
III. Is THE SERVICE'S ANNOUNCED POSITION A PRINCIPLED ADDITION
TO THE CURRENT NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION POLICY?
Given the potential impact of the Rabbicular Trust,55 it is nearly certain
that challenges to the Service's position will soon follow. 6 Present Service
ruling positions on related issues-private insurance for rabbi trust interests57
and a rabbi trust utilizing a net worth financial performance vesting
trigger 58-call into question the ability of the Service to draw the line at
Rabbicular Trusts. 9 However, inconsistent ruling positions are a poor basis
for predicting litigation success.' The policy underlying the interpretation of
"property" for purposes of I.R.C. § 83(a) indicates that the Rabbicular Trust
may not survive the Service's announcement of its demise.6'
51. See supra notes 43-48, infra note 52 and accompanying text.
52. Actually, adding the desired triggers to the existing instrument would not require a true
-'switching" of instruments. Modifications of rabbi trusts are permitted under current law. Moreover,
the addition of financial vesting triggers would not require the establishment of a new trust but merely
a modification to the existing trust. See supra note 31 (discussing the financial vesting trigger of the
Rabbicular Trust).
53. By definition, the other aspects of the trust would be unchanged. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text (describing the change from a rabbi trust to a Rabbicular Trust); Rev. Proc. 92-64,
supra note 27 (establishing a model rabbi trust).
54. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038, supra note 40.
55. See supra Part II.D.
56. In fact, at a seminar sponsored by the St. Louis Bar Association, the holder of the Rabbicular
Trust Service Mark indicated, in spoken remarks to Mr. Brisendine, that litigation would be
forthcoming on this issue.
57. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038, supra note 40.
58. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014, supra note 40.
59. See supra note 40.
60. Cf. Crummy v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968) (Service arguing unsuccessfully
on behalf of itself and the Tax Court before the Ninth Circuit).
61. In addition, the Service has indicated through the remarks of Thomas Brisendine that it will
not rule on Rabbicular Trust plans in the near future. Reilly, supra note 1. There has not been any
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A. Private Insurance for Rabbi Trust Interests
In Private Letter Ruling ("Priv. Ltr. Rul.") 93-44-038,62 the Service
permitted an employee to defer income recognition under a rabbi trust
arrangement when the employee had secured, without the assistance of the
employer,63 private insurance against the failure of the rabbi trust interest due
to the employer's insolvency.6 The Service ruled that so long as the
individual, and not the company, procured the insurance, then the assets paid
into trust were still available to the firm's general unsecured creditors. 65
Because of that inherent possibility of loss, deferral of that employee's tax
liability was appropriate until the benefits were actually received by the
employee 6 While this ruling has been attacked as unprincipled for arguably
removing all actual risk of loss,67 the ruling differentiates this case by
direct challenge on this issue. Moreover, the confidential nature of the private letter ruling process
makes it all but impossible to determine when this issue will be raised before the Service.
62. Supra note 40.
63. It is the lack of a transfer between the employer and the employee that permits this exception
to exist at all. Arguably, employer participation would involve just such a transfer, and thus would
defeat deferral of tax on the deferred compensation paid to trust.
Another point here is that the employer did not have to be involved. This ruling concerned a
publicly traded corporation with a Standard and Poor's bond rating of AA or better. The Service
focused on the fact that the information gathered by the insurer was publicly available. This seems to
draw a questionable distinction between taxpayers who work for financially sound companies and
those who do not. Viewed from the tax policy end, however, this distinction appears to create an
insupportable result. Employees who arguably receive deferred compensation that is subject to very
little risk, and therefore much closer to property under § 83(a), are allowed to take the next incremental
step and secure the income absolutely via insurance, without tax consequences. Were this feat
attempted by those actually subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, that is, those employees whose
employers had not obtained this premium bond rating, they would be subject to severe tax
consequences. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038, supra note 40.
64. Id. It does not appear that this ruling is limited by when the insurer agrees to pay, or under
what circumstances. Rather, it appears that the sole issue is the employer's involvement in the
procurement of the insurance. Thus, if the employer agreed to reimburse the employee subsequent to
the purchase of the insurance (which was in fact the case), there is no effect on the deferral decision.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. This determination focuses only on the transfer of assets from employer to employee. See
infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
67. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038, supra note 40. The Service found that the insurance arrangement in
question did not affect the underlying rabbi trust. It is important to note, however, that this type of
insurance guarantees that the employee will receive the deferred income in the future. A principled
application ofI.R.C. § 83(a) focuses only on whether property has been transferred. See I.R.C. § 83(a)
(1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1996). In making this assessment, the regulations make an allowance
for "promise[s] to pay money or property in the future," not because these are preferred transfers, but
because of the quite real problems associated with valuing a promise. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1996).
The problem of valuation is wholly eliminated once the substantial uncertainty is removed. The
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examining on whom the risk of loss requirement operates under I.R.C.
§ 83(a).68
The Service's position in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-038 implies that the payor
company (the employer) must shoulder the risk of loss.6 9 This position is
premised on the I.R.C. § 83(a) language requiring inclusion in gross income
of"[p]roperty transferred in connection with [the] performance of services."7
So long as the company plays no role in obtaining or purchasing the
insurance, then in the event of the company's insolvency, no transfer will
have taken place from the company to the employee.7 Therefore, the
contingency precluding inclusion of the rabbi trust interest under the I.R.C.
§ 83(a) definition of property remains intact.72 The fact that the employee is
no worse off in cases of the employer's insolvency is not considered in the
Service's analysis.73 While the insurance payout to the employee is income
under I.R.C. § 61(a),74 it was not paid by the company for the performance of
services. Instead, the payout is the result of an independent contractual
arrangement between the employee and the insurer.7" Thus, private insurance
secured by the employee against company insolvency meets the technical
requirements for deferral of tax on the property until actual receipt.
The Rabbicular Trust fails to divorce two critical elements: company
insolvency and payout to the employee. Thus, the Rabbicular Trust does not
fit under the narrow exception created by the insurance ruling. While it is true
that the result to the employee is the same-receipt of the deferred
compensation in the event of insolvency-the payor is different.76 Under a
Service's myopia, focusing on the party eliminating the uncertainty rather than on the party receiving
the property, leads to a bizarre tax result in this case.
68. Priv. Ltr.'Rul. 93-44-038, supra note 40. However, I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994) and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e) (1996) do not discuss any such requirement.
69. The inference is based on the Service's distinction between the case of employee-provided
security, which is permissible, and employer-provided security, which is not. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-44-
038, supra note 40.
70. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994); see supra note 63.
71. See supra notes 63-64, 67, 69.
72. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. 1.83-3(e) (1996) (excluding "unfunded and unsecured
promisefs]").
73. Although, arguably, it should be. See supra notes 67, 69.
74. I.RLC. § 61(a) (1994) (including in gross income "income from whatever source derived").
75. See I.R.C. § 83 (1994); supra notes 67-69.
76. The difference in payor is not a trivial distinction. Under the terms of I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994), it
is only transfers of property for the performance of services that are covered. When the insurance
company pays, it is merely fulfilling a contractual obligation, the insurance policy, and is not
compensating the employee directly for services rendered. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying
text.
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Rabbicular Trust, the company "transfers property" in connection with the
rendering of services by the employee and thus meets the technical inclusion
grounds of I.R.C. § 83. 7 ' Any argument in support of extending the insurance
exception to cover the Rabbicular Trust would therefore be
counterproductive.78 While the insurance ruling arguably represents an attack
on the policy and principles underlying I.R.C. § 83, it nonetheless supports
the conclusion that the Rabbicular Trust is not a viable instrument for tax
deferral of income.
B. Net Worth Trigger Discounted
Far more troubling for the Service's position is the recent ruling in Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014,8o approving a plan that uses model rabbi trust language8
and a vesting trigger based upon a decline in the net worth of the company."
Nothing distinguishes this plan from the Rabbicular Trust, except for possibly
degree.83 Thus, without any technical grounds for distinguishing the net worth
trigger from the Rabbicular Trust, the Service appears to attack Rabbicular
Trusts in one breath and approve them in the next.84 Arguably, the net worth
trigger no longer represents the Service's ruling position and will be
unsupported in future ruling requests.85 Given the absence of precedential
In the insurance case, the payor is an independent third party, the insurer, who makes the payment
to the employee. In the case of a Rabbicular Trust, the payor is always the company that created the
trust. By the terms ofa Rabbicular Trust, the conversion from a rabbi trust to secular trust occurs at the
direction of the company prior to insolvency. See supra note 28. There is no third-party contract; thus,
the argument for deferral in the insurance context is not present in the Rabbicular Trust context.
77. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994); see supra note 63.
78. This is true since any argument that shifts the focus of the risk of loss requirement, see supra
note 67, from the employer to the employee would necessarily defeat the fragile exception permitted in
the case of third-party insurance, see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 67-68. If § 83 is read as requiring that a contingency exist if the income is to
be excluded, the private insurance situation in which all contingency is removed would seem to
conflict with § 83.
80. Supra note 40.
81. Rev. Proc. 92-64, supra note 27.
82. The ruling contains an example of a financial performance vesting trigger, see supra note 31,
because the event resulting in termination of the rabbi trust interest is independent of the employee and
instead dependent on the employer.
83. In a Rabbicular Trust, as envisioned, numerous triggers would be utilized by the employer to
reduce default risk, not just one.
84. This ruling issued from Division 4, while Thomas A. Brisendine, the author of the Service's
position, is from Division 1. See Reilly, supra note 1.
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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value accorded letter rulings, 6 and given that the Service has recently come
out against the Rabbicular Trust,87 the existence of the ruling approving a net
worth vesting trigger may give hope to proponents of the Rabbicular Trust.
However, the ruling probably provides little useful ammunition for the
litigation ahead.
IV. A LOOK TOWARDS LITIGATION: THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
THE RABBICULAR TRUST
With the Service set to resist employers' efforts to achieve income deferral
through the use of Rabbicular Trusts, the final test of the viability of these
plans will almost certainly be conducted in the courts.88 Proponents of the
Rabbicular Trust argue that the existence of any risk of forfeiture precludes
inclusion of the trust under I.R.C. § 83's definition of property.89 These
proponents stress that financial ratio triggers merely lessen, but do not
eliminate, the potential for plan default due to insolvency." The Service, on
the other hand, argues that the test of I.R.C. § 83 requires a quantifiable
measure of risk, not a mere possibility of failure. From a litigation
perspective, the Service's argument finds more support in the plain language
of the statute, congressional intent, and the policies underlying I.R.C. § 83.9
Thus, the Service will likely prevail at the litigation stage of this dispute.
The critical chink in the armor of Rabbicular Trust proponents is the
language of the regulations covering I.R.C. § 83. Specifically, the problem
lies in the language discussing property transferred to the employee for the
performance of services.92 The Rabbicular Trust side must argue that
Rabbicular Trust interests are not "property" for purposes of I.R.C. § 83(a)
because, absent employer insolvency, there will not be a transfer to the
86. By law, Private Letter Rulings are valid only as to the taxpayer requesting them, and only on
the facts as presented to the Service. I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1994). Many rulings have been abandoned
after an initial favorable response. It is difficult to see why this will not also be the case with the net
worth trigger ruling if the Service so decides.
87. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
88. The challenge will likely arise through the denial of deferral in a test case, because the
Service may well refuse to rule on Rabbicular Trusts specifically.
89. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1996).
90. Technically, this is correct. However, the test is substantial risk of forfeiture, a point
conveniently ignored by the proponents of the Rabbicular Trust. See supra note 22.
91. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
92. I.RC. § 83(a) (1994); see supra notes 14, 63.
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employee.93 The argument relies on the proposition that the Service must
either declare that all interests subject to the slightest contingency of non-
payment fall outside the definition of property contained in I.R.C. § 83, or
evaluate every Rabbicular Trust plan on the facts of the underlying triggers
employed to determine if enough uncertainty exists to warrant deferral of the
employees' tax liability until actual payment.94 Neither of these positions is
likely to gather much support among the judiciary.
The first position is insupportable precisely because the courts have not
defined property so narrowly in any other context within the I.R.C.9" Under
the proponents' theory of property, even secular trusts would qualify for
deferral, since the possibility exists that payments will not be made due to
embezzlement or some other equally improbable reason. And, while it may
well be argued that rabbi trust interests are not all equally subject to default,96
it is difficult to conceive of a court excusing willful subversion of
congressional intent on the basis that the enacting provisions of the I.R.C. fail
to achieve universal fairness.
The second proposition is equally shaky. Under a fact-specific regimen,
the Service would be forced to examine every plan to determine whether,
given the mix of financial ratio triggers-and the possible combinations
border on the infinite-a real possibility of default through insolvency
exists.97 This is not only administratively unworkable, it is unthinkable that
the Service would ever be charged with making such business-specific
judgments.9" No support exists for the proposition that Congress ever
contemplated such a role for the Service, nor is there policy support for
93. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 17.
95. No cases were discovered at the Tax Court or appellate levels giving such a narrow definition
of property either for income or estate and gift tax purposes. See, e.g., Sproull v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 244 (1951), affdpercuiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
96. See supra note 47. An example of the possible inequality would be the general preference for
a General Motors rabbi trust over a start-up, bio-tech, rabbi trust interest, all else being equal.
97. The Service's evaluation would ostensibly require a specific determination of some allowed
amount of default risk (say 20%), which among other things, would result in a contest to determine
how close to that standard compensation planners could draft. Equally as difficult would be the
articulation and administration of the standard.
98. Any business judgment by the Service would be a direct comment on the management of the
underlying firm. A judgment by the Service disallowing a debt-to-equity trigger would imply that the
Service did not feel that the firm was viable below that debt-to-equity threshold. The Service is ill-
equipped to make such business-specific determinations and, as a matter of policy, should not be
placed in that position.
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implementing one." In fact, in an effort to avoid business-specific judgments,
the Service has established model approved instruments.3 Yet, absent such a
fact-specific analysis, the Service would be left without any principled basis
to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate uses of financial ratio
vesting triggers.
The courts, like the Service, will likely attempt to draw the line at
protections written into the plans by their creators, employers.'"' This
decision will necessarily involve a retreat from the net worth ruling; °2
however, such a distinction between types of protections is fully consistent
with the plain language of I.R.C. § 83 and with Congress's intent to tax
income from services in the period earned unless presented with a significant
uncertainty.
V. CONCLUSION
While it may always be true that clever tax attorneys will stay one step
ahead of the Service in exploiting the infirmities of the Internal Revenue
Code, this maxim is no guarantee of ultimate success. In the case of the
Rabbicular Trust, the simple extension of the vesting trigger concept to
encompass financial performance considerations of the issuing company has
proven to the Service, and will prove to the courts, that the reported demise of
the Rabbicular Trust is by no means greatly exaggerated.
Karl Dickhaus
99. The Service is, supposedly, in the revenue collection business exclusively.
100. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 92-64, supra note 27.
101. Seesupranote30.
102. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-08-014, supra note 40.
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